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Abstract 
Portraying a digital business strategy seems to be what capital markets are looking for 
in firms. Tech companies raise staggering amounts of capital and long-established 
companies that announce a digital business strategy double their firm value over night. 
By drawing from information economics literature, this study investigates drivers and 
outcomes of a firm’s digital business strategy by utilizing the new construct of a firm-
wide digital orientation. Applying a cross-industry longitudinal study, results indicate 
that initial public offerings provide financial flexibility to drive a firm’s digital 
orientation. Yet, against expectations, capital markets react negatively to firms depicting 
a digital orientation post share issuance. We explain this finding on the basis of investors’ 
digital myopia. Our analysis yields surprising, yet promising results. 
Keywords: digital business strategy, financial market performance, equity offerings 
Introduction 
Firms portraying a digital business strategy (DBS) seem to be what investors are looking for. Tech 
companies such as Lyft Inc. raised extraordinary amounts of capital during their initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and Kodak, almost bankrupt, doubled its firm value in the same day it announced the launch of a 
blockchain-based rights management service (Field 2018; Salinas 2019). Or consider Tesla’s firm value 
(USD 64.75 billion) on August the 7th, 2018, which exceeded BMW’s firm value (USD 64.36 billion) 
although their electric car operations levels were almost identical and BMW’s net income was six times 
higher than Tesla’s (Bharadwaj et al. 2018). The question therefore arises: How do firms become and what 
is the value of being digital?  
A DBS is defined by leveraging digital resources for value creation in- and outside the information 
technology function and has been at the heart of company strategies in the past decade (Bharadwaj et al. 
2013). Although researchers and practitioners reach unity upon the fact that a firm’s DBS is driven by 
environmental and organizational conditions, scholars have paid little attention to the underlying 
mechanisms which provide the monetary base to promote digital initiatives in the first place, namely: 
corporate financing policies (Kahre et al. 2017). The merger of SunTrust and BB&T, two American banks, 
fortifies the need for a better understanding, as both companies merged to accelerate their digital initiatives 
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in a competitive manner. The CEO of BB&T stressed the urgency as follows: “We face a fundamental choice 
– disrupt our business or be disrupted” (Rooney 2019). While there is a lack of understanding regarding 
the underlying financing mechanisms of a firm’s DBS, research is regarding its monetary value generation 
in discord. Some scholars see a DBS as a transformational power to secure long-term competitiveness by 
creating and capturing value to boost firm performance (Drnevich and Croson 2013). Others are more 
skeptical and suggest that a firm’s DBS acts as value destroying by increasing the imitability of the firm 
(e.g., Grover and Kohli 2013). An explanation for these shortcomings can be traced back to two overarching 
deficits in DBS research: (1) In the vast majority of studies (e.g., Majchrzak et al. 2016), the research design 
is based on surveys and case studies, resulting in excerpts rather than cross-industry longitudinal, more 
generalizable analyses. (2) The measurement of a DBS frequently relies on information technology 
investments as a proxy (e.g., Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004), which do not necessarily reflect the trans-
functional nature of a firm’s DBS (Kahre et al. 2017). Beutel (2018) addressed these shortcomings and 
developed a new measure for a firm’s DBS, namely the firm-wide strategic orientation: digital orientation 
(DO). A firm’s DO can be seen as the operationalization (“the how”) of the overarching DBS (“the what”) 
and reflects how a firm implements and orchestrates its DBS throughout the organization. Due to the 
absence of an established measure of firms’ DBS, only a limited amount of studies has empirically validated 
drivers and monetary outcomes of a firm’s digital strategy (for an overarching literature review, cf. Kahre 
et al. (2017)). Studies focusing on financial implications concentrate on accounting-based firm performance 
measures and neglect stock market implications. This is surprising because security prices reflect expected 
future cash flow and thus more holistically capture monetary outcomes (Mizik and Jacobson 2007).  
This study addresses these research gaps by assessing (a) how financial flexibility drives firms’ DO, as slack 
resources provide the ground to facilitate the experimentation and implementation of a digital agenda 
(Hess et al. 2016), and (b) how investors value firms with a more pronounced DO. To do so, we use a 
modified version of the traditional chain of effects model proposed by Rust et al. (2004). The model follows 
the logic that corporate strategy impacts market position, which, in turn, impacts the financial position and 
subsequently the stock market value of the firm. We extend the model by including a corporate financing 
event (i.e., IPO), which impacts corporate strategy as it interplays with corporate resource allocation 
strategies in direction and in volume (Kurt and Hulland 2013). We thus build on the resource-based view 
and information economics literature (i.e., signaling theory). The IPO event is the most profound equity 
offering in a firm’s lifecycle and offers two investigation mechanisms: First, newly issued firms extensively 
increase their resource base (e.g., higher financial flexibility) and have easier access to additional capital, 
which subsequently affects resource and capability intensive strategies (Wu 2012). Second, recent public 
firms suffer from liability of market newness (Certo et al. 2009). Because limited public information is 
available, investors are highly dependent on and sensitive to the information IPO firms offer after the IPO 
event and incorporate any additional information into their reservation price for a given stock (Certo et al. 
2009; Fama et al. 1969; Malkiel and Fama 1970).  
Our research contributes to the information systems literature in four ways: First, we contribute from a 
theoretical perspective by analyzing a firm’s DBS from an information economics standpoint, which 
provides the DBS literature with a novel theoretical perspective. Second, we contribute to literature and to 
the overall discussion by providing empirical cross-industry longitudinal evidence on antecedents of a DBS 
and the information value a DBS holds. We verify whether a firm’s financial flexibility drives a firm’s DO 
and how capital markets subsequently value a firm (e.g., Bharadwaj et al. 2013). Third, we reveal an ongoing 
misconception of a firm’s DBS (managerial vs. investor perception) and offer an explanation to the 
underlying mechanisms. Finally, we open up various opportunities for future research to assess the value a 
DO holds and increase the scrutiny to view information technology/information system strategies not as a 
subordinate but rather as a company-wide strategy (e.g., Kahre et al. 2017). 
Theory and Hypotheses  
The work of Kohli and Grover (2008) illustrates that information technology creates value, when seen as a 
synergistic part of the wider business organism, and that this value contributes to the differential value 
when viewed from the resource-based view perspective, as resources and capabilities are heterogonous and 
imperfectly mobile. This view contributes to the concept of a firm’s DBS, which raises the organizational 
information technology function from a supporting role to a cornerstone of a firm’s business strategy (Chan 
and Reich 2007). Bharadwaj et al. (2013) define a firm’s DBS as an “organizational strategy formulated and 
 The Information Value of Being Digital 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 3 
executed by leveraging digital resources to create differential value” (Bharadwaj et al. 2013, p. 472) and 
associate four core strategic themes with a firm’s DBS: extended business scope, scale, speed, and new 
sources of value creation and capture. Extended business scope relates to the digitalization of existing or 
the creation of new products and services; scale relates to building and harnessing network effects; speed 
relates to increased speed for product launches and decision-making; and new sources of value creation 
and capture relates to harvesting the new advancements of digital technology. While a firm’s DBS refers to 
the overarching business strategy, a firm’s DO reflects the manifestation of a firm’s DBS. DO exhibits how 
a firm conducts its business, allocates resources, and promotes behavior in the digital domain (Beutel 
2018). We define a firm’s DO in a similar vein as Beutel (2018) as an organization’s guiding principles to 
create the proper firm-wide behavior to capture and create value through the usage of digital technologies 
to digitize operations (internal and external) and offered goods to achieve a competitive advantage. DO is 
an aggregated construct consisting of six sub-dimensions: digital infrastructure, digital processes, digital 
skills, digital portfolio, digital competencies, and digital governance. 
Information is a key driver of capital markets as it affects the decision-making processes of individuals and 
subsequently the security price (Fama et al. 1969). Theory on efficient capital markets proclaims that stock 
prices reflect the fundamental value of the underlying asset and that the security price is a reflection of 
investors’ expectation about the firm’s future cash flows (Malkiel and Fama 1970). However, due to 
information asymmetries, it is difficult for investors to comprehensibly observe and evaluate the 
characteristics (e.g., firm quality) of a firm. To bridge information gaps, firms indicate and communicate 
firm quality by sending signals of observable information about unobservable firm characteristics to the 
uninformed party (Connelly et al. 2011).  
To evaluate the information value a DBS holds for capital markets, we use the efficient capital market 
hypotheses and draw upon two broader concepts of the information economics literature: the concepts of 
costly state falsification (i.e., a signal needs to be verifiable post-hoc) and cheap talk (i.e., reputation builds 
on truthful reporting) (Saboo and Grewal 2012). These concepts are chosen as signal theory proclaims that 
a credible signal requires a cost (Connelly et al. 2011). At first glance, it seems appropriate to argue that a 
firm’s DBS represents a costless signal because companies could pretend to follow a digital agenda. But a 
long-term perspective allows to conclude otherwise, since public companies interact in an infinite number 
of games with capital markets. We therefore propose that a firm’s DBS represents a postponed costly signal, 
because a firm’s DBS (a) is verifiable at some point since it materializes in the company eventually (e.g., 
investments made in digital infrastructure) and (b) builds reputation with investors if implemented as 
proclaimed (Lacker and Weinberg 1989; Stoken 2000). Figure 1 depicts our research model. 
Hypotheses Derivation 
A DBS consists of four core strategic themes regarding extended business scope, scale, speed, and new 
sources of value creation and capture. Implementing strategic plans along these core themes is cost-
intensive, as they depend on investments and/or require the utilization of existing and the creation of novel 
firm-wide capabilities (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Mithas and Rust 2016). The sheer cost intensity of a digital 
agenda can be seen by the commitment of J.P. Morgan Chase and the Bank of America, who allocated USD 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
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10.8 billion in 2018 and USD 16 billion in 2017, respectively, to investments in digital technology and digital 
human capital (Rooney 2019). As pre-IPO firms typically do not possess the financial resources and are not 
able to purchase the missing capabilities (Wu 2012), we propose that the IPO event causes a shift in DO as 
financial constraints are lifted. An IPO provides financial resources from IPO proceeds through the offered 
shares (between 1998 and 2007, the average IPO proceed was more than USD 215 million (Certo et al. 
2009)) and eases access to additional capital as a firm’s stock is publicly tradable after the IPO. Wiklund 
and Shepherd (2005) provide supporting evidence by showing that unused (slack) resources effectively 
drive experimentation and implementation of entrepreneurial projects. We therefore argue that an IPO has 
an uplifting effect and promotes a firm’s DO.  
H1: An IPO event is positively related to a firm’s post-IPO level of DO. 
As investors do not possess the private knowledge of firm insiders (e.g., managers), information 
asymmetries make it hard for investors to assess firm quality, especially in the aftermath of the IPO, as 
financial reporting requirements have just been imposed and a limited amount of information is publicly 
available (Certo et al. 2009; Wu 2012). Therefore, it is of particular importance for a recent public firm to 
actively engage in signaling firm quality to continue to be an appealing investment case. Newly issued firms 
can signal firm quality by voluntarily transmitting information about positive prospects, which, for 
example, impact the earnings-per-share ratio or intangible asset base as both are a determinant of 
shareholder value (Bendig et al. 2018). We argue that a firm’s DBS is such a signal because considerable 
evidence suggests that a DBS benefits a firm. Mithas and Rust (2016) show that a firm’s DBS increases 
revenue or decreases costs, or both, and therefore increases organizational efficiency and effectiveness. 
Moreover, an increased focus on a DBS can lead to strategic advantages and subsequently to a competitive 
advantage, because organizations increase their organizational flexibility (e.g., infrastructural changes), 
which makes it easier to respond to upcoming opportunities and threats (Kahre et al. 2017). Although 
evidence exists that a DBS increases the transparency of the company and thus the imitability by 
competitors (Kohli and Grover 2008), which can threaten the positive prospects of a firm, we argue that a 
DBS and its related mechanisms extend the differentiation from competitors and increase the business 
sustainability. A DBS therefore gives a positive signal to capital markets. However, while we argue that 
capital markets react positively to firms depicting a DBS, the information value of a DBS should increase 
with its manifestation. A DO holds additional information value for investors as it exhibits the intensity and 
embeddedness of a firm’s overall DBS. For example, a DO illustrates how firms develop and/or source 
distinctive digital competencies such as the presence of digital know-how (e.g., for the Lego Group, this was 
a crucial enabler and amplifier of their digital agenda (El Sawy et al. 2016)). Further, it displays the intensity 
of the recalibration of a firm’s organizational structure and processes. For instance, studies investigating 
the impact of digital technologies, such as data analytics and artificial intelligence, on existing or new 
processes find a significant increase in firm productivity (Tambe 2014). In conclusion, a firm’s DO will 
positively affect the earning-per-share ratio (through revenue increase or cost decrease, or both) and a 
firm’s intangible asset base (e.g., through product quality or customer services). Moreover, prior research 
shows that investors react positively to an increase in the earnings-per-share ratio and intangible assets 
(Bendig et al. 2018; Rust et al. 2004). Hence, we hypothesize: 
H2: A firm’s level of DO is associated with positive post-IPO abnormal stock returns. 
Method, Sample and Variable Operationalization 
We built the IPO sample in this study using the Security Data Company (SDC) Platinum new issue database. 
It comprises of IPO prospectuses (N=1,463) and Management Discussion and Analysis (MDA) sections in 
10-K reports retrieved from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database of firms that 
went public in the U.S. between 2004 and 2013. Additionally, we collected a comparison group of MDA 
sections based on the Compustat database of firms that have been publicly traded for at least five years. The 
resulting sample reflects a cross-industry longitudinal setting ranging from 2004 to 2018. We gathered 
firm-level accounting data from the Compustat database. To calculate abnormal stock returns, we gathered 
data from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research and Security Prices, which provides raw stock 
returns on a monthly basis, and the Kenneth French Data Library, which provides data on the risk factors 
on a monthly basis. Our final sample consists of 3,164 firm-year observations in the IPO sample and 4,672 
firm-year observations in the comparison sample. 
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The DO construct is operationalized as an aggregated construct composed of six sub-dimensions. Each sub-
dimension contains a specific list of words for its individual domain (Beutel 2018). To operationalize these 
six dimensions and conflate them into a single measure, we employed computer-aided text analysis to count 
the number of words used in an individual MDA section for each domain. This methodology is commonly 
used in strategy research and recent publications underline its accuracy for measuring a firm’s strategic 
orientation (e.g., Grühn et al. 2017). This approach is theoretically based on the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis 
and the attention-based view of the firm. The former refers to the usage of words, which indicates the 
direction of managerial attention and the intensity of attention based upon the usage and frequency of 
words used (Sapir 1944; Whorf 1956). The latter refers to a firm’s posture and behavior as a function of 
managerial attention (Ocasio 1997). Thus, a firm which publishes an MDA section that includes a more 
frequent usage of words associated with the six DO dimensions reflects a stronger DO level for the year.  
To measure a firm’s DO, we employ both an unadjusted and adjusted measure. The former refers to the raw 
level of DO; the latter controls for narrative themes and different strategic agendas between industries 
(Beutel 2018; Grühn et al. 2017). We differentiate between the IPO sample and the comparison sample 
through a binary variable to test for the impact an IPO event entails. To ensure robustness of our findings, 
we employ two methodologies to compute a firm’s abnormal stock returns: (1) compounded abnormal stock 
returns (CAR) and (2) buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BAHR) (e.g., Bendig et al. 2018). Both measures 
reflect investors’ expectation about future firm performance and are regularly applied in measuring capital 
markets’ perception. We follow this approach and conduct our study based on an annual basis to measure 
the long-term information value a firm’s DO holds for investors similar to Mizik and Jacobson (2003). The 
estimation window analyzes abnormal stock returns up to five years post-IPO. Table 2 summaries the 
definitions and sources of the main constructs. Additionally, we control for several variables on the firm 
and environmental level to account for potentially unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. 
Table 1. Summary Table of Main Constructs 
Variable Definition Source 
Unadjusted digital 
orientation 
Word count of each DO dimension in an MDA section in a given year, divided 
by total words, normalized to a word count by 1,000 words, aggregated to one 
measure. 
Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis sections 
of 10-K reports Adjusted digital 
orientation 
Difference between the unadjusted digital orientation level of a firm and the 
yearly average of the DO of competitors in the same industry. 
IPO occurrence 
Binary variable that takes the value “1” if the firm is part of the IPO sample and 
“0” otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
new issue 
database 
Compounded 
abnormal stock 
return (CAR) 
We calculate the expected returns for each firm based on the four-factor model, 
subtract expected from realized returns to generate monthly abnormal returns 
and take the logarithm of the monthly CARs to generate the annual CARs. 
Chicago’s Center 
for Research and 
Security Prices 
and Kenneth 
French Data 
Library 
Buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns 
(BHAR) 
We calculate the expected returns for each firm based on the time-varying risk 
approach by regressing realized returns against the log of lagged firm risk 
characteristics. The resulting residuals are the BHARs by firm and year. 
Results 
To test our hypotheses, we calculated six models shown in Table 2. We applied generalized estimating 
equation regressions with an identity link function, autoregressive correlation structure, cluster robust 
standard errors, and a Gaussian distribution (Ballinger 2004). We find support for Hypothesis 1 in model 
2 (βIPO occurrence = 0.4305; p < .05). Hypothesis 2 is not supported in models 4 and 6; instead of a positive 
relationship, we find a significantly negative relationship (βAdjusted DO (CAR)= -0.0470; p < .001 | βAdjusted DO 
(BHAR) = -0.0410; p < .001).  
To validate the robustness of our findings, we performed a variety of tests. Calculating the variance inflation 
factors to examine multicollinearity shows no abnormalities. To ensure that endogeneity is not an issue, we 
ran two assessments. First, we corrected for potential endogeneity using the Heckman model correction 
and calculating the inverse Mills ratio based on potential antecedents of a firm’s DO (Hamilton and 
Nickerson 2003). Second, as a firm’s DO development may follow a longer process, the success of an IPO 
may also be affected by a firm’s DO (e.g., through signaling). As the success of the IPO (proxided by IPO 
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proceeds as commonly used in IPO research (Certo et al. 2009)) affects the post-IPO stock market 
performance, we account for this potential endogeneity by including an instrumental variable into our 
models, namely: predicted IPO success. We predicted a firm’s IPO proceeds in a linear regression by using 
a firm’s DO manifestation as showcased in the IPO prospectus and other firm level variables (e.g., sales 
volume). As both variables controlling for endogeneity (DO correction term and predicted IPO success) do 
not trigger changes in significance and direction, we conclude that endogeneity is not a problem.  
Table 2. Results of the Regression 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unadjusted DO CAR BHAR 
Independent variables Base H1 Base H2 Base H2 
Controls             
Firm age -0.1364  0.0083  0.0388  0.0421  0.0359  0.0388  
Firm size -0.4740 *** -0.4676 *** 0.0461 * 0.0261  0.0197  0.0023  
Risk of insolvency -0.0316  -0.0305  -0.2231 *** -0.2389 *** -0.1917 *** -0.1968 *** 
Firm performance 0.0010 ** 0.0010 ** 0.3396 *** 0.3288 *** 0.3112 *** 0.3018 *** 
Competitive intensity 0.0960  0.1027  0.0092  0.0146  0.0075  0.0122  
Environmental dynamism -0.0079  -0.0079  -0.0541 * -0.0512 * -0.0558 * -0.0532 * 
Market-to-Book ratio     0.3238 *** 0.3302 *** 0.2989 *** 0.3044 *** 
Asset growth a      -0.2796 *** -0.2718 *** -0.2673 *** -0.2604 *** 
IPO proceeds     0.0283 * 0.0357 † 0.0200 † 0.0266 † 
             
Predicted IPO success     0.0032  0.0062  0.0020  0.0047  
DO correction term     0.0170  0.0182  0.0114  0.0125  
             
IPO occurrence   0.4305 *         
Adjusted DO       -0.0470 ***   -0.0410 *** 
             
Industry dummies? YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year dummies? YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
             
Observations 7,836  7,836  1,459  1,459  1,459  1,459  
Wald chi-squared 781.36 *** 1042.07 *** 2244.23 *** 2386.56 *** 772.30 *** 820.44 *** 
Mean VIF b 1.04  1.04  1.16  1.17  1.16  1.17  
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported for non-dummy variables. 
a Variable is lagged by one year. 
b Variance inflation factor (VIF). 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
Discussion and Research Outlook 
This study demonstrates that an IPO event positively impacts a firm’s digital endeavors. Our results provide 
support for the argument that a firm’s DO depends on a firm’s resource availability, as an IPO increases the 
financial resource base substantially and provides the firm with slack resources to pursue and implement 
its digital entrepreneurial projects (Wiklund and Shepherd 2005).  
Against our expectations, capital markets react negatively to firms with a stronger DO. Viewing investor 
reactions from a prospect theoretical perspective, which posits that individuals do not rest their beliefs on 
rational outcomes but rather on potential gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), allows to 
generate three insights for the underlying psychological mechanisms triggering these reactions. First, a 
higher DO ultimately results in a higher devotion and resource allocation towards a firm’s DBS (Beutel 
2018). As mixed evidence regarding the impact of a firm’s DBS exists, it might be difficult for capital markets 
to pinpoint the true value creation potential a DO entails. Under prospect theory, investors react sensitively 
to information on potential losses and rank losses higher than gains (Benartzi and Thaler 1995); capital 
markets may therefore solely associate expenditures such as initial information technology investments 
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with a DO and neglect the potential gains. Second, business digitalization requires shifts in the 
organizational configuration (e.g., restructuring) which need to be implemented through profound 
organizational transformations entailing and increasing firm risk (Hess et al. 2016; Tanriverdi and Ruefli 
2004). Increased firm risk affects return expectations, which, in turn, impacts the sentiment towards and 
the price of a firm’s stock (Fama et al. 1969; Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004). Third, the utility of an option 
depends on a reference point rather than an outcome (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). As investors are 
primarily interested in short-term shareholder value (Chakravarty and Grewal 2011) and an investor’s 
reference point excludes intermediates such as information technology investments and increased firm 
risks of a digital agenda, the reference point reflects higher immediate returns triggering negative capital 
market reactions. Hence, capital markets might penalize the firm for pursuing a digital agenda and not the 
short-term shareholder value maximizing strategy. A comparable practical example would be the previously 
mentioned one of BMW and Tesla (e.g., Bharadwaj et al. 2018). Building on these arguments, we conclude 
that investors react myopically towards firms depicting a digital agenda and capital markets do not 
adequately assess a firm’s DO. We therefore suggest that the adequate assessment of a firm’s digital 
endeavors depends on contextual factors, which justify the associated investment volume and risk increase. 
This study makes three theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to DBS literature by introducing a 
novel approach of signal models which lay the foundation for analyzing the information value a DBS entails 
for capital markets (e.g., Bharadwaj et al. 2013). We extend the current understanding of how investors 
perceive a firm’s digital agenda and present, to the best of our knowledge, the first large-scale, longitudinal 
and cross-industry empirical study analyzing the impact of a DBS on firm value (e.g., Beutel 2018; 
Bharadwaj et al. 2013). Second, theory advocates that investors have an incentive to align with long-term 
value-enhancing strategies and should downgrade stock prices of firms focusing on strategies gratifying 
short-term shareholder value (Mizik and Jacobson 2007). This study shows the contrary: Investors react 
negatively to firms depicting a digital agenda, which is a long-term value enhancing strategy. We therefore 
build theory on investors’ digital myopia and barriers for implementing a firm’s digital agenda. Third, this 
study extends current literature on drivers of a DBS by providing empirical evidence that a firm’s financial 
flexibility is a prerequisite for a firm’s DO. Moreover, our findings provide a first indication that a firm’s DO 
holds dynamic properties and that these properties are dependent on triggers such as external capital 
events, which lead to shifts in a firm’s DO (e.g., Kahre et al. 2017).  
The present study also provides valuable insights for managers and investors which help them to drive and 
value a firm’s digital endeavors. First, we note that managers and investors can proactively look for trigger 
events (e.g., external capital events) to break a firm’s strategic stagnation. Second, managers should hold 
on to a long-term perspective when implementing a firm’s DBS. Proceeding this way mitigates the risk of 
realigning strategy with investor expectation, as capital markets are likely to penalize firms pursuing digital 
activities in the short term. Thus, managers should actively engage in changing the attitude of capital 
markets by increasing the disclosure about the short-term benefits, the success factors, and the potential a 
DBS holds for the respective organization. 
Up to the conference, we will further strengthen our theory on investors’ digital myopia by analyzing how 
contextual factors influence investors’ perception of the DO. To do so, we follow two avenues. First, as the 
examples of BMW and Kodak showcased, the stability or instability of current operations plays a crucial 
role for investors to assess a firm’s digital agenda. BMW depicted strong profits and Kodak an overall 
instability in firm performance by having filed for bankruptcy earlier to the announcement (Bharadwaj et 
al. 2018; Field 2018). Hence, we currently examine influencing factors in different subgroup comparisons 
(i.e., high profit vs. low profit/high sales growth vs. low sales growth). Second, the firm’s environment 
justifies the necessity of a business strategy which is the firm’s approach to cope with environmental 
uncertainty and to reduce firm risk (Saboo and Grewal 2012). We therefore examine how environmental 
uncertainties influence investors’ digital myopia. We include technological turbulence as the rate of 
technological advances and market turbulence as the instability in consumer preferences in our research 
model (Saboo and Grewal 2012). A DBS provides the firm with capabilities to obtain access to information 
from diverse pools (Bharadwaj et al. 2013) and increases a firm’s customer-focused dynamic capabilities 
(Setia et al. 2013), which, as we believe, counter the prevailing uncertainties and increase the information 
value a DO holds for investors. Finally, to further substantiate our current results, we will expand our 
analyses beyond the IPO event and triple the number of observations. 
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Our study offers various avenues of future research. First, we only provide empirical evidence on the 
increase in manifestation as a first indication for the temporal pervasiveness and not on the vertical or 
horizontal pervasiveness of a firm’s DO. An analysis of this pervasiveness would lead to a more granular 
and processual view on important success factors (e.g., Kahre et al. 2017). Second, scholars should analyze 
additional events which trigger a shift in a firm’s DO (e.g., share repurchases) to increase the understanding 
of the temporality of a firm’s DO. Third, in addition to the appropriateness of the signal, its creditability is 
an additional factor for investors (Saboo and Grewal 2012). We therefore urge scholars to investigate how 
moderators of credibility (e.g., career variety of the CIO and the CIO’s power degree within the TMT (Vial 
2019)) impact investors’ digital myopia. Fourth, future research can deepen our understanding of financial 
and non-financial DBS outcomes. For example, scholars could analyze how a firm’s DO impacts firm 
innovativeness, which ultimately contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage and can explain abnormal 
profits (e.g., Kleis et al. 2012). This procedure would reveal the predominant value source for investors. 
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